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ABSTRACT 
Seventy years ago, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,1 the 
United States Supreme Court eloquently held that the state could not compel public school-
children to salute the flag while reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. The decision has been 
heralded as one of the Court’s most significant free speech cases because it acknowledged 
expansive protection for freedom of conscience. But recently, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Barnette’s protection does not extend to college 
students who challenge their public institution’s curriculum because university enrollment 
is “voluntary.” The impact of this decision is potentially far-reaching. Because academia 
has recently placed greater emphasis on “real life” education, college students are in-
creasingly constrained to adopt their university’s ideology as their own in order to suc-
cessfully earn a degree. Indeed, in the last decade, public universities have forced students 
to lobby for legislation, to provide live counseling, and to embrace political philosophies 
that reflect the dogmatic preferences of the universities in contradiction to the students’ 
consciences. As dissenting students around the country are raising compelled speech 
claims to such requirements, federal courts are increasingly being asked to decide what 
degree of constitutional protection is available for them. 
While few courts have addressed the question directly, the Eleventh Circuit’s so-
called “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier entirely forecloses constitutional review of cur-
ricular compelled speech claims brought against public universities. But the court misread 
Barnette and the case precedent that has developed since that decision. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment is implicated when public uni-
versities compel student speech in the curriculum-related context, and two federal courts 
of appeals have done the same in the curricular context. The “voluntary enrollment” dis-
qualifier not only goes against the weight of judicial precedent, but taken to its logical 
conclusion, would produce devastating consequences for liberty on the university campus 
and beyond. For if a student waives his right to refuse to affirm state-sponsored ideas 
when he voluntarily enrolls at college, it is doubtful that other constitutional rights would 
remain secure. This article maintains that federal courts should reject the “voluntary en-
rollment” disqualifier and permit judicial review of compelled speech claims aimed at 
public university curricula. 
                                                          
 1. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
2014] FIRST AMENDMENT ENCLAVE 159 
INTRODUCTION 
Two women face a crisis of conscience at their respective universities. Lucy, a jun-
ior, is taking a Political Science course at a state college in California. She is a devout 
Roman Catholic who believes very strongly in the Catholic Church’s stance against con-
traception. Her professor has just assigned her class to draft a graded paper supporting the 
Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) proposed rule that includes contracep-
tion in the required “preventative care” coverage under the Affordable Care Act.2 Moreo-
ver, her professor will submit the students’ papers to HHS for consideration during the 
public comment period on the proposed rule. 
Alysse is a senior enrolled at a state university in Texas. She is an ardent gun control 
advocate and has worked tirelessly for stricter gun laws in her home state of Connecticut 
following the Sandy Hook shooting. The Regents of the University of Texas System are 
currently considering a policy that would allow students and faculty at all of its academic 
institutions to carry firearms on campus. Alysse’s Criminology professor has just required 
her class to draft a graded essay in favor of the measure that he will present to the Regents 
as they consider this proposed policy. 
While conscience-based conflicts with public university curricula are nothing new,3 
the potential for conflicts such as the ones faced by Lucy and Alysse have heightened in 
recent years as higher education has increasingly emphasized experiential learning4 and 
other “real life” opportunities both inside and outside the classroom.5 Typically, such dis-
                                                          
 2. 42 U.S.C § 300gg-13(a)(4). 
 3. See Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (Christian pacifist students attending 
state university brought a free exercise challenge to a curricular provision requiring all males to complete a course 
in military training.). 
 4. See Academic Affairs Highlights: Experiential Learning, U. COLO., Vol. 2, Issue 2, Feb. 2012, available 
at https://www.cu.edu/sites/default/files/OAA_Highlight_2.2--Experiential_Learning.pdf  (“Experiential learn-
ing integrates classroom learning with hands-on experience. It encompasses a wide range of activities including 
internships, service learning, study abroad, and research.”). 
 5. See Peter Stokes, Job Skills Increasing Focus of Many Colleges, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 4, 2013), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2013/10/04/job-skills-increasing-focus-many-colleges-essay.  
The pursuit of jobs or job readiness or real-world work experience seems to be the trend 
of trends . . . . This can be seen in the growing focus on experiential learning opportuni-
ties—whether it takes the form of internships and co-ops, or field research experiences, or 
participation in business incubators, or any number of other kinds of outside-the-classroom 
learning experiences.  
Id. 
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putes have arisen when a student is required not only to express but to adopt the univer-
sity’s ideological message as his own in order to successfully complete a project,6 intern-
ship,7 clinical,8 or degree.9 When such a conflict occurs, may a dissenting student bring a 
First Amendment10 compelled speech challenge to the curricular requirement that forces 
him to affirm an offensive belief? 
Off campus, the legal answer to this question would be simple. A citizen would have 
a compelled speech claim against any state mandate that forced affirmance of a belief. 
However, the Supreme Court has previously insinuated that public universities may be 
immune from constitutional challenges to their curricula. In 2011, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit relied on these hints to hold that a graduate student 
was barred from raising a compelled speech challenge to part of her state university’s 
counseling curriculum because she “voluntarily enrolled” in the program.11 This so-called 
“voluntary enrollment” disqualifier12 effectively precludes constitutional review of com-
pelled speech challenges to public university curricula. 
But the “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier is not good law or policy, and this article 
will explain why. Part I explores the background of the compelled speech doctrine and 
traces the development of the “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier. Part II exposes the two 
foundational legal flaws inherent in the disqualifier. First, it rests upon the errant view that 
a student’s voluntary choice alone automatically nullifies unlawful government coercion. 
In fact, federal courts have recognized, in a variety of First Amendment contexts, that 
illegal compulsion may exist even when a citizen voluntarily chooses to participate in a 
state-sponsored program. Second, the “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier mistakenly as-
sumes that the state may condition a public education upon the forfeiture of constitutional 
freedoms simply because education is a “privilege” rather than a “right.” This difference, 
                                                          
 6. See Citrus College: Compulsory Anti-War Speech, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC., 
http://thefire.org/case/26.html (last visited July 16, 2014) (A Citrus College professor required her students to 
write anti-war letters to President George W. Bush “demanding” that America not go to war with Iraq. The 
professor penalized the grades of those students who dissented or refused to send the letters.); Missouri State 
University: Political Litmus Test in School of Social Work, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC., 
http://thefire.org/case/837.html (last visited July 16, 2014) (Missouri State University threatened to expel social 
work student Emily Brooker when, as a matter of personal conscience, she refused to send a signed letter to the 
Missouri state legislature advocating in favor of homosexual foster parenting and adoption.).  
 7. See Rhode Island College: Violation of Student’s Freedom of Conscience, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. 
EDUC., http://thefire.org/case/669.html (last visited July 16, 2014) (Rhode Island College’s School of Social 
Work informed Bill Felkner that he could no longer pursue a Master’s degree in the program when he refused a 
mandatory internship that would require him to lobby the Rhode Island legislature for social policies which he 
opposed.).  
 8. See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012) (Eastern Michigan University expelled Julea Ward from 
the graduate counseling program for failing to provide gay-affirming therapy to a client in EMU’s counseling 
clinic.). 
 9. See Columbia University: Ideological Litmus Tests at Teachers College, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. 
EDUC., http://thefire.org/case/725.html (last visited July 16, 2014) (Columbia University’s Teacher’s College 
required students to demonstrate a “commitment to social justice” as a condition of graduating from the pro-
gram.).  
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 11. Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 878 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 12. The author will primarily refer to this principle as either the “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier or the 
“voluntary enrollment” nullifier throughout this article, along with other variations. 
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sometimes called the “right-privilege” distinction, is no longer a legitimate basis for deny-
ing constitutional claims. The Supreme Court has implicitly acknowledged these flaws by 
recognizing that the First Amendment is implicated when public universities compel stu-
dent speech in the curriculum-related context, and two federal courts of appeals have done 
so in the curricular context. Finally, Part III highlights the dangerous and disturbing policy 
implications if the “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier becomes the law of the land. This 
article, therefore, maintains that the “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier is unsound as a 
matter of law and policy and that a student should not be foreclosed from raising a com-
pelled speech challenge to a public university’s curriculum merely because she chose to 
matriculate there.13 
PART I: COMPELLED SPEECH AND THE RISE OF THE “VOLUNTARY ENROLLMENT” 
DISQUALIFIER. 
The compelled speech doctrine is rooted in the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.14 This clause precludes the government from both censoring and compelling 
speech because it protects the citizen’s “decision of both what to say and what not to say.”15 
The Supreme Court first enunciated the compelled speech doctrine in the landmark deci-
sion of West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette.16 There, Jehovah’s Witness children 
contested a part of the public school program that required all students to salute the flag 
and recite the Pledge of Allegiance.17 The constitutionality of the mandatory Pledge had 
reached the high court no less than five times previously, and the most recent case had 
upheld it.18 But in Barnette, the Court reversed course and ruled that public schools cannot 
force students to recite the Pledge.19 In so doing, it relied on the students’ “freedom of 
mind,” which it found rooted in the Free Speech Clause.20 The Court held that the students 
effectively were being forced to “declare a belief,” and that such compulsion transgressed 
a foundational principle of the First Amendment: 
 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to con-
fess by word or act their faith therein.21 
 
The Supreme Court has since clarified, in a variety of situations, that the compelled speech 
                                                          
 13. This article does not address the standard that should be applied to such claims. That is a matter for further 
scholarly discussion. However, such discussion cannot take place if compelled speech claims are extinguished 
upon matriculation. 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. I. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” Id. 
 15. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988) (emphasis in original). 
 16. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 17. Id. at 629. 
 18. Id. at 664 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
 19. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594 (holding that governments could require the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance 
and that the Constitution permits “legislation of general scope not directed against doctrinal loyalties of particular 
sects”). 
 20. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637, 639, 642. 
 21. Id. at 642. 
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doctrine precludes the state from forcing private citizens to “foster . . . an idea they find 
morally objectionable.”22 For “[a]t the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that 
each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expres-
sion, consideration, and adherence.”23 For instance, the government may not require citi-
zens to display an objectionable state motto on their license plates,24 force a newspaper to 
publish a reply to one of its articles,25 command a private parade organization to include a 
group of marchers that would impart a message the organizer does not wish to convey,26 
or even to fund speech with which one disagrees.27 While the Supreme Court has thus ruled 
on the compelled speech doctrine in a variety of contexts, it has never squarely addressed 
its application to the public university curriculum.28 
The Supreme Court did, however, review a free exercise suit against a university 
curriculum. In Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, Christian pacifists al-
leged that the university’s required course in military training transgressed their religious 
liberty, but the Court disagreed.29 Because Hamilton had obvious implications for the Je-
hovah’s Witnesses’ religious-based objections to the Pledge, the Barnette Court distin-
guished between the collegiate and pre-collegiate contexts30: 
 
This issue is not prejudiced by the Court’s previous holding that where 
a State, without compelling attendance, extends college facilities to pu-
pils who voluntarily enroll, it may prescribe military training as part of 
the course without offense to the Constitution. It was held that those who 
                                                          
 22. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977). 
 23. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (2013) (quoting Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)). 
 24. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 (“We conclude that the State of New Hampshire may not require appellees to 
display the state motto upon their vehicle license plates . . . .”). 
 25. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). 
Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with a compulsory access 
law and would not be forced to forgo publication of news or opinion by the inclusion of a 
reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its 
intrusion into the function of editors.  
Id.  
 26. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995) (“We granted 
certiorari to determine whether the requirement to admit a parade contingent expressing a message not of the 
private organizer’s own choosing violates the First Amendment. We hold that it does . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
 27. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977). 
The fact that the appellants are compelled to make, rather than being prohibited from mak-
ing, contributions for political purposes works no less an infringement of their constitu-
tional rights. For at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should 
be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by 
his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.  
Id. 
 28. As discussed infra in Part II.C.2., the Supreme Court has addressed the compelled speech doctrine’s 
application to a university requirement that compelled extracurricular speech for an educational purpose. Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
 29. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934). 
 30. In both Hamilton and Barnette, the student-plaintiffs raised religious objections to the curriculum. In 
Barnette, the Court noted the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious objections, but held that the Pledge implicated rights 
under the Free Speech Clause. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634-35 (1943); Hamilton, 
293 U.S. at 262.  
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take advantage of its opportunities may not on ground of conscience re-
fuse compliance with such conditions. In the present case attendance is 
not optional.31 
 
According to the Court then, the nature of the enrollment decision itself was sufficient to 
permit a constitutional challenge to a public school curriculum (where enrollment was 
compulsory) and also to bar such a challenge to a university curriculum (where enrollment 
was voluntary). 
This “voluntary enrollment” theory lay virtually dormant32 for sixty-eight years until 
2011, when the Eleventh Circuit applied it to foreclose a compelled speech challenge to a 
state university’s curricular requirement. In Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, professors in the 
Counselor Education Program at Augusta State University (ASU) imposed a remediation 
plan upon first-year student Jennifer Keeton in response to controversial comments she 
had made regarding homosexuality.33 According to ASU officials, this remediation plan 
was a curricular measure designed to address ethical deficiencies in Ms. Keeton’s ability 
to “be a multicuturally competent counselor.”34 The plan required Ms. Keeton to read in-
formation about and to increase her exposure to the gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgendered, 
and questioning (GLBTQ) population and then to write monthly essays about the experi-
ences.35 Her re-admission into the counseling program depended on how her experience in 
the remediation plan “influenced her beliefs.”36 When she decided to not complete the 
plan, ASU expelled her from the program.37 
                                                          
 31. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 631-32 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 32. The Sixth Circuit has tangentially referred to the “voluntary enrollment” principle on two occasions. In 
Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797, 799 (6th Cir. 1972), the court held that a high school’s R.O.T.C. training require-
ment violated the free exercise rights of an objecting student. The Spence court found that Hamilton was not 
controlling because, among other distinctions, “enrollment at California’s university . . . was voluntary while 
attendance here is required by law.” Id. at 799. Twenty-one years later, in Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State 
Univ., Coll. of Veterinary Med., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993), the court mentioned the voluntary enrollment 
principle while reviewing a college student’s post-settlement petition for attorney’s fees. The court denied the 
petition because the college’s requirement that veterinary students take a course involving operations on live 
animals did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 178. After reaching this conclusion, the court, in passing, 
commented that the student could not “demand that the College change its curriculum” because she “was not 
compelled to attend” and she knew “that operations on live animals were part of the curriculum” when she en-
rolled. Id. at 180-81. 
 33. Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 867 (11th Cir. 2011). The Author represented Ms. Keeton at 
the district court level.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Specifically, Ms. Keeton’s remediation plan required her to:  
(1) attend at least three workshops which emphasize improving cross-cultural communi-
cation, developing multicultural competence, or diversity sensitivity training toward work-
ing with the GLBTQ population; (2) read at least ten articles in peer-reviewed counseling 
or psychological journals that pertain to improving counseling effectiveness with the 
GLBTQ population; (3) work to increase her exposure and interaction with the GLBTQ 
population, by, for instance, attending the Gay Pride Parade in Augusta; (4) familiarize 
herself with the Association for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Issues in Coun-
seling (“ALGBTIC”) competencies for Counseling gays and Transgender Clients; and (5) 
submit a two-page reflection to her advisor every month summarizing what she learned 
from her research, how her study has influenced her beliefs, and how future clients may 
benefit from what she has learned.  
Id. at 870. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 868 n.3. 
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Ms. Keeton sued, claiming, among other things, that the remediation plan forced her 
to affirm an ideological belief in violation of the compelled speech doctrine.38 The district 
court refused to issue a preliminary injunction and the Eleventh Circuit, relying on the 
“voluntary enrollment” disqualifier, affirmed, holding that Ms. Keeton had no redress for 
her compelled speech claim.39 
 
We find Barnette and its progeny inapplicable here for several reasons. 
First, unlike the plaintiff in Barnette, Keeton may choose not to attend 
ASU, and indeed may choose a different career. . . .  
 Likewise, ASU has conditioned participation in the clinical practi-
cum and graduation on compliance with the ACA Code of Ethics, and 
Keeton, having voluntarily enrolled in the program, does not have a 
constitutional right to refuse to comply with those conditions.40 
 
With this declaration, the court of appeals not only barred Ms. Keeton’s compelled speech 
claim, but effectively immunized universities in the Eleventh Circuit from such claims in 
the future. 
Therefore, the Keeton court held what the Barnette Court only implied: that a stu-
dent’s “voluntary enrollment” entirely forecloses compelled speech challenges to univer-
sity curricula. But neither court fully explained the constitutional rationale for the conclu-
sion. However, both relied on Hamilton, which outlined the disqualifier’s logic briefly: 
 
California has not drafted or called [appellants] to attend the Univer-
sity. They are seeking education offered by the state and at the same 
time insisting that they be excluded from the prescribed course solely 
upon grounds of their religious beliefs . . . . [A]ppellants’ contentions 
amount to no more than an assertion that the [Constitution] confers the 
right to be students in the State University free from obligation to take 
military training as one of the conditions of attendance.  
 Viewed in the light of our decisions, that proposition must at once 
be put aside as untenable.41 
 
Hence, Hamilton sets forth two potential justifications. First, because students choose to 
enroll at a public university (i.e., they “are not drafted”), there is in fact no legal compul-
sion.42 Without such compulsion, both free exercise and compelled speech claims would 
presumably fail. Second, the government may place conditions on the receipt of state ben-
efits up to and including the forfeiture of constitutional rights.43 Accordingly, students 
choosing to receive the benefits and privilege of a public university education effectively 
waive any constitutional objections to the manner in which that education is provided. 
Either of the two options would yield the same result as the disqualifier: the barring of 
                                                          
 38. Keeton, 664 F.3d at 878. 
 39. Id. at 867-68, 880. 
 40. Id. at 878 (emphasis added). 
 41. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934) (emphasis added). 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. 
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compelled speech claims in higher education. As discussed below, both justifications are 
flawed. 
PART II: THE REJECTION OF THE “VOLUNTARY ENROLLMENT” DISQUALIFIER’S TWO 
PREMISES. 
The “voluntary enrollment” nullifier’s two foundations find no support in the law. 
First, a citizen’s initial choice to register for school or any state-sponsored program has no 
bearing on whether the state subsequently coerces that citizen. Second, the state can no 
longer condition the receipt of “privileges,” such as a public education, upon the waiver 
of constitutional liberties. Federal courts have implicitly acknowledged these defects in 
the disqualifier by recognizing that students have a right to bring compelled speech claims 
against both curricular and curricular-related university policies. 
A. A Student’s Voluntary Decision to Enroll in a University Cannot Extinguish His 
Compelled Speech Claims. 
The Barnette Court attempted to distinguish Hamilton based on its perception that 
state school attendance laws rendered public elementary and secondary schools uniquely 
compulsory.44 But the majority ignored its own precedent holding that the state cannot 
mandate public education.45 Barnette, interpreted in light of this disregarded precedent, 
implicitly recognizes that compulsion sufficient to trigger a cognizable compelled speech 
claim can exist even where enrollment is not mandatory. Hence, the nature of enrollment 
is irrelevant to the question of whether the state has exercised unauthorized compulsion. 
The relevant First Amendment jurisprudence since Barnette confirms this position. 
1. In Barnette, Students were not Forced to Enroll, and yet the Supreme Court 
Recognized their Compelled Speech Claims. 
If the Barnette majority hoped to justify the “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier 
based on the compulsory nature of pre-collegiate education, then it stumbled in its first 
step. For, as Justice Frankfurter explained in his dissent, West Virginia did not, and indeed 
could not, compel students to attend as a matter of constitutional law.46 Eighteen years 
prior, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court reviewed a state statute that required “gen-
eral attendance at public schools by . . . children, between 8 and 16 who have not com-
pleted the eighth grade.”47 The Court voided the statute, explaining that, “The fundamental 
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general 
power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from 
public teachers only.”48 This holding, Frankfurter explained, rendered it “impossible . . . 
to differentiate what was sanctioned in the Hamilton case from what [was] nullified” in 
Barnette.49 
                                                          
 44. W. Va. State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1934). 
 45. See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (affirming 
the district court’s grant of preliminary orders restraining the state from enforcing an act that required children 
between ages of eight and sixteen to attend a public school). 
 46. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 656-57 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting). 
 47. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 531. 
 48. Id. at 535 (emphasis added). 
 49. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 657. 
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As a matter of constitutional decree, therefore, neither public high school students 
nor college students are compelled to enroll. Consequently, both the Christian pacifists in 
Hamilton and the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Barnette “voluntarily enrolled” at their respec-
tive schools. Given, then, that the perceived distinction between enrollment in secondary 
and higher education is fictitious, the “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier is unfounded. 
Shorn of this errant distinction, Barnette implicitly stands for the proposition that uncon-
stitutional compulsion may exist even when student enrollment is not officially required. 
2. Government Coercion Exists in a Variety of Non-Compulsory Contexts. 
Indeed, since Barnette, the federal courts have affirmed the position that illicit gov-
ernment coercion can exist outside of contexts where attendance or participation is com-
pulsory. A sample of the Supreme Court’s landmark compelled speech cases, as well as 
related cases under the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses,50 bear this out. 
a. Compelled Speech 
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, the Supreme Court reviewed a Florida 
statute that required any newspaper which had criticized a political candidate to print the 
candidate’s response to that criticism.51 The Court struck down the law because “compul-
sion exerted by government on a newspaper to print that which it would not otherwise 
print. . . . is unconstitutional.”52 The law did not require the paper to publish the critical 
editorials in the first place. Nevertheless, the paper’s voluntary choice to do so did not, in 
the Court’s opinion, mollify the coercive nature of the state’s attempt to force it to print a 
reply. 
Similarly, in Wooley v. Maynard, the Supreme Court addressed a New Hampshire 
law making it a misdemeanor to cover the portion of the automobile license plate that bore 
the state motto, “Live Free or Die.”53 The objecting litigants—Jehovah’s Witnesses—vio-
lated the law on multiple occasions because they found the motto “repugnant to their 
moral, religious, and political beliefs.”54 The Court held that New Hampshire could not 
enforce the law against the Maynards even though it required only the “passive act” of 
carrying the motto on their license plate.55 “[W]here the State’s interest is to disseminate 
an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individ-
ual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.”56 Citizens, 
such as the Maynards, choose whether or not to drive a car. And according to the Wooley 
Court, such choice does not extinguish a citizen’s right to object to serving as an unwilling 
“mobile billboard” for the state’s ideological message.57 
Likewise, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Group of Boston, the Court reviewed a 
                                                          
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. I. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof . . . .” Id. 
 51. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243 (1974). 
 52. Id. at 256. 
 53. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1977). 
 54. Id. at 705. 
 55. Id. at 715. 
 56. Id. at 717. 
 57. Id. at 715. 
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state court ruling that a private parade organizer’s exclusion of gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
marchers from the St. Patrick’s Day parade violated Massachusetts’ public accommoda-
tions law.58 The state court opined that the parade organizer had no First Amendment right 
to engage in sexual orientation discrimination.59 However, the high Court unanimously 
disagreed with the lower court’s appraisal of the matter. In the Court’s view, the state 
unlawfully “compel[led] the [parade organizer] to alter the message [of the parade] by 
including one more acceptable to others.”60 
 
While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful 
behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than 
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, how-
ever enlightened either purpose may strike the government.61 
 
Therefore, the Supreme Court found that the state had unconstitutionally compelled speech 
even though the plaintiff voluntarily chose to organize the parade. 
In similar fashion, the Supreme Court has also ruled in favor of civil servants,62 at-
torneys,63 professional fundraisers,64 public grant recipients65 and a host of other compelled 
speech litigants in contexts where neither attendance nor participation was compulsory. 
The Court has been consistent: Illegal coercion can exist even in voluntary contexts. 
b. Establishment Clause 
Establishment Clause cases teach the same lesson. Both the compelled speech doc-
trine and the Establishment Clause preclude state coercion. While the former prohibits the 
government from forcing a citizen to speak, the latter,66 at a minimum, “guarantees that 
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”67 
If mandatory enrollment were a constitutional prerequisite to actionable coercion, certainly 
                                                          
 58. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995). 
 59. Id. at 563. 
 60. Id. at 581. 
 61. Id. at 579. 
 62. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355 (1976) (holding that public employment is not mandatory, yet a 
sheriff unconstitutionally compelled the speech of his employees when he required them to “pledge their political 
allegiance to the Democratic Party”). 
 63. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990) (holding a law license is not compulsory, yet the 
state bar may not, consistent with the First Amendment, use a dissenting attorney’s dues for ideological activities 
not relevant to the legal profession or the quality of legal services). 
 64. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 784 (1988) (holding that no one is required 
to become a fundraiser, yet the state transgresses the First Amendment if it compels those who do to disclose the 
percentage of contributions actually given to charity). 
 65. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2330 (2013) (holding that 
private organizations are not compelled to seek public grants, but if they do, the government cannot “requir[e] 
recipients to profess a specific belief” as a condition of receiving the grant). 
 66. Justices Stevens and Ginsberg, in the context of rejecting a limited reading of the Establishment Clause, 
have compared the right to be free from compelled speech with the minimum Establishment Clause guarantee 
against government-imposed “religious coercion.” See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 733 n.35 (2005) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (Under the view that the Establishment Clause “reaches only the governmental coercion of 
individual belief or disbelief . . . the Establishment Clause would amount to little more than a replica of our 
compelled speech doctrine with a religious flavor”) (citations omitted). 
 67. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).  
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the courts would have said so in the myriad of public school Establishment Clause cases. 
But they have not so held. To the contrary, the courts have found unconstitutional coercion 
in circumstances where even simple attendance at the contested school event was not of-
ficially required. 
Perhaps the clearest example of this principle is found in Lee v. Weisman, wherein a 
student challenged the prayer at her public high school graduation.68 The parties stipulated 
that graduation attendance was voluntary, but the Supreme Court held the societal pressure 
both to attend and to participate in the prayer—though “subtle and indirect”69—suffi-
ciently compelled the students to join in a religious exercise in violation of the Establish-
ment Clause.70 
 
Petitioners . . . argu[ed] that the option of not attending the graduation 
excuses any inducement or coercion in the ceremony itself. The argu-
ment lacks all persuasion. Law reaches past formalism. . . . Attendance 
may not be required by official decree, yet it is apparent that a student is 
not free to absent herself from the graduation exercise in any real sense 
of the term “voluntary,” for absence would require forfeiture of those 
intangible benefits which have motivated the student through youth and 
all her high school years.71 
 
Notably, the Lee Court’s analysis did not address the nature of the petitioner’s enrollment 
at the school, but rather focused on the disputed event itself.72 The Court found unauthor-
ized coercion existed even though it conceded that graduation attendance was not “re-
quired by official decree.”73 
Similarly, in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Supreme Court struck 
down a public school district’s policy that authorized a student body representative to de-
liver an invocation at school football games.74 The school district insisted that impermis-
sible coercion did not exist because attendance at the games was voluntary.75 The Court 
pointed out that some students were required to attend, but even those under no official 
compulsion would feel “immense social pressure” to conform.76 “Even if we regard every 
high school student’s decision to attend a home football game as purely voluntary, we are 
nevertheless persuaded that the delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of 
coercing those present to participate in an act of religious worship.”77 As in Lee, and with-
out discussing enrollment, the Court ruled that proscribed coercion existed notwithstand-
ing the lack of official compulsion to attend the games. 
                                                          
 68. Id. at 584. 
 69. Id. at 593. 
 70. Id. at 596 (“The Constitution forbids the State to exact religious conformity from a student as the price 
of attending her own high school graduation. This is the calculus the Constitution commands.”). 
 71. Id. at 594-95. 
 72. Lee, 505 U.S. at 594-96. 
 73. Id. at 595. 
 74. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000). 
 75. Id. at 310. 
 76. Id. at 311. 
 77. Id. at 312. 
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The principle from Lee and Santa Fe—that the absence of initial compulsion to at-
tend a public school event does not eliminate the possibility of subsequent state coercion 
once a student chooses to attend—also applies in the college environment. For example, 
in Anderson v. Laird, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed 
a federal regulation requiring cadets and midshipmen at three military academies to attend 
chapel services on Sundays.78 The court held that the chapel requirement violated the Es-
tablishment Clause because it compelled the students to “engage in religious practices and 
to be present at religious exercises.”79 Unlawful coercion existed, in the court’s opinion, 
even though students could be excused from chapel80 and enrollment in the military acad-
emies was entirely voluntary.81 On the latter point, the court specifically distinguished 
Hamilton.  
 
In Hamilton [], the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
state university’s requirement that all students must participate in mili-
tary training against attack under the Free Exercise Clause. The Court 
reasoned that since the students were not compelled to attend the univer-
sity, they were not compelled to violate their religious scruples. The con-
tinued validity of this reasoning is doubtful in light of recent Supreme 
Court decisions.82 
 
The D.C. Circuit’s holding pointedly refutes the foundation of the “voluntary enrollment” 
disqualifier. If the government cannot force a voluntarily-enrolled student merely to sit 
mutely at a chapel service, then it cannot compel him actually to articulate a message with 
which he disagrees. The latter infringement is surely more intrusive than the former. Stu-
dents in both situations should have a constitutional remedy against such state compulsion. 
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit voided supper prayers at Virginia Military Institute 
(VMI) as a form of compelled religious exercise under the Establishment Clause.83 In Mel-
len v. Bunting, VMI defended the meal invocations because the cadets were adults and the 
policy permitted them to excuse themselves from the prayers.84 But, the court explained, 
VMI’s educational philosophy emphasized obedience and conformity and the supper 
prayer itself was instituted to build solidarity among the cadets.85 In this context, the court 
held the students would find participation obligatory despite the prayer’s “technical ‘vol-
untariness.’”86 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, agreed with the D.C. Circuit that the officially 
optional nature of the school supper prayers did not automatically nullify governmental 
                                                          
 78. Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curium). 
 79. Id. at 291. 
 80. Id. at 293 (“It is of no importance that certain cadets and midshipmen may be excused from attendance 
for conscientiously held beliefs.”). 
 81. Id. at 295 (“It bears emphasis that the fact that attendance at the military academies is voluntary does not 
eliminate the possibility of coercion.”). 
 82. Id. at 295 n.80 (emphasis in original).  
 83. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 372 n.9 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Even if dining in the mess hall was truly 
voluntary, the First Amendment prohibits [VMI] from requiring religious objectors to alienate themselves from 
the VMI community in order to avoid a religious practice.”). 
 84. Id. at 371. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 372. 
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coercion. 
The lesson to be learned from Lee, Bunting, and the cases in between is that illegal 
compulsion can exist even in specific educational environments that students voluntarily 
enter. The courts in these cases squarely rejected arguments to the contrary and did not 
consider the voluntary nature of enrollment in the school relevant to the coercion analy-
sis.87 It follows then that curricular mandates, which are required to graduate, would create 
an even greater risk of compulsion than attendance at graduation, supper, chapel, and foot-
ball games and would consequently have a higher claim to constitutional protection. 
Therefore, claims that university curricula impermissibly compel speech should likewise 
be entitled to judicial review. 
c. Free Exercise Clause 
The lesson that a citizen’s initial voluntary choice alone does not eliminate unlawful 
compulsion also holds true with respect to the Free Exercise Clause, which—like the com-
pelled speech doctrine—forbids the government from “compel[ling] affirmation of a re-
pugnant belief.”88 In Torcaso v. Watkins, the petitioner was appointed to the office of no-
tary public by the governor, but was refused his commission when he would not “declare 
a belief in God” pursuant to the state constitution.89 The petitioner sued and appealed after 
the state’s highest court ruled against him.90 The United States Supreme Court flatly re-
jected the state court’s reasoning that the petitioner was “not compelled” to believe any-
thing. “The fact, however, that a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot pos-
sibly be an excuse for barring him from office by state-imposed criteria forbidden by the 
Constitution.”91 The state’s “religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades the 
appellant’s freedom of belief and religion.”92 
Torcaso’s free choice to pursue public office did not alleviate the coerciveness of 
the state’s criteria or disqualify him from bringing a free exercise claim.93 Similarly, the 
choice to pursue a state university education should neither diminish the coerciveness of 
curricular criteria that compel speech, nor bar a student from bringing a compelled speech 
claim thereto. 
The preceding cases—whether in school, college, or elsewhere—demonstrate that a 
citizen’s voluntary decision alone does not per se eliminate claims against unlawful gov-
                                                          
 87. But see Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 1997) and Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232 (6th 
Cir. 1997), wherein the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Sixth Circuit rejected Establishment Clause chal-
lenges to religious invocations at state university graduation ceremonies because attendance at the ceremonies 
was voluntary. However, while the courts found attendance to be voluntary, neither court based its decision upon 
the “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier.  
 88. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963). The close relation between the compelled speech doctrine 
and the Free Exercise Clause is also buttressed by the fact that the Barnette majority expressly tried to distinguish 
its holding from Hamilton with the voluntary enrollment qualifier. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 631-32 (1943). As this section argues, this distinction ultimately failed. 
 89. Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 490 (1961). “Article 37 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland 
Constitution provides: ‘[N]o religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification for any office of profit or 
trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God . . . .’” Id. at 489. 
 90. Id. at 489. 
 91. Id. at 495-96 (emphasis added). 
 92. Id. at 496. 
 93. Id. 
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ernment compulsion. A citizen may choose to enroll in public elementary school, second-
ary school, or college. He may choose to attend graduation, football games, supper time, 
or to seek public office, and these choices alone will not extinguish his right to constitu-
tional review if the government subsequently compels him to engage in a religious exercise 
or to affirm a repugnant belief. The same should be true if the state compels him to speak. 
Consequently, the “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier is unwarranted, and cannot serve as 
a principled basis to deny valid compelled speech claims to university curricula, unless it 
can be justified on other grounds. 
B. A Student’s Decision to Avail Himself of the “Privilege” of a State Education 
Cannot Extinguish his Compelled Speech Claims because the “Right-Privilege” 
Distinction is no longer a Viable Ground for Denying Constitutional Claims. 
The “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier rests upon another principle raised in Ham-
ilton that was not refuted in Pierce, namely, the constitutional distinction between “rights” 
and “privileges.” In the classical understanding, “‘rights’ are interests held by individuals 
independent of the state.”94 As such, they exist prior to the state and are possessed by per-
sons at birth by virtue of their humanity and as endowments from their Creator.95 This 
view of rights was adopted by America’s founders and is forever enshrined in the Decla-
ration of Independence. 
 
WE hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness. . . .96 
 
A modern view might differ with the source of rights, but few would question the basic 
premise that a right, at its core, is a “liberty, claim, or power to be respected by the gov-
ernment.”97 In contrast to rights, “‛privileges’ are interests created by the grace of the state 
                                                          
 94. 1 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 7:3 (2014). 
 95. Id. See also JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE ON THE RELIGIOUS RIGHTS OF MAN 
(1784). 
Because we hold it for a “fundamental and undeniable truth” that religion, or the duty 
which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by 
reason and conviction, not by force or violence. . . . This right is, in its nature, an unalien-
able right. . . . because what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. . . 
. [T]his duty is precedent, both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of 
civil society. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . “[T]he equal right of every citizen to the free exercise of his religion according to the 
dictates of his conscience,’ is held by the same tenure with all our other rights. If we recur 
to its origin, it is equally the gift of nature. . . .” 
Id. at 3-4, 11 (emphasis added). See also THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, QUERY XVIII: 
MANNERS (1781) (“And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm 
basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the [g]ift of God?”) (emphasis added); 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA (1774) available at 
http://www.monticello.org/site/jefferson/quotations-jefferson-memorial (“God who gave us life gave us lib-
erty.”).  
 96. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 97. BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 972 (Compact ed. 2011). 
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and dependent for their existence on the state’s sufferance.”98 Such privileges can take 
many forms, including, but not limited to, funding, public employment, licenses, public 
forums, unemployment benefits, and—important for our purposes—education at a public 
university.99 
The right-privilege distinction operates on the simple premise that no one has a right 
to government largess.100 Accordingly, while the government cannot constitutionally re-
strict the enjoyment of rights, it can attach conditions to the privileges it grants, up to and 
including the total surrender of constitutional freedoms.101 Hamilton is a textbook example 
of the operation of this distinction. There, the Court rebuffed the students’ argument that 
public education was a “right,”102 and instead held that the state could condition the “‘priv-
ilege’ of attending the university”103 on the successful completion of military training, even 
if that training transgressed the students’ religious beliefs.104 The Eleventh Circuit echoed 
this position when it held that Ms. Keeton did not have “a constitutional right to refuse to 
comply with [the] conditions” of her degree.105 
While the right-privilege distinction was in force when Hamilton and Barnette were 
decided, it has effectively been overruled since.106 In its place the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine has arisen, which holds that government “may not deny a benefit to a person 
on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests.”107 The right-privilege dis-
tinction’s extinction removes the last of the twin premises undergirding the “voluntary 
enrollment” disqualifier. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit was wrong to apply it to extin-
guish university students’ compelled speech claims generally. 
1. The Rise of the Right-Privilege Distinction 
In the 1892 case of McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, Oliver Wendell Holmes 
famously enunciated the right-privilege distinction while addressing the petition of a po-
liceman who had been fired for engaging in political activity.108 Speaking for the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Holmes dismissed the claim bluntly, by stating, “[t]he 
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right 
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 99. Id. 
 100. William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. 
L. REV. 1439, 1442 (1968). 
 101. 1 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 7:3 (2014). 
 102. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 253 (1934). 
 103. Id. at 261 (emphasis added). 
 104. Id. at 262. 
 105. Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 878 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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 107. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). 
 108. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
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to be a policeman.”109 Holmes reasoned that a public employer may attach conditions to 
employment, including restrictions on speech, in the same manner a private employer 
does.110 So, Officer McAuliffe was just like any other employee; he could not protest the 
infringement upon his freedom of speech because he “takes the employment on the terms 
which are offered him.”111 
Three years later, Holmes reaffirmed his view that recipients of governmental priv-
ileges receive very limited constitutional protection. In Commonwealth v. Davis, a 
preacher contested his conviction for speaking in a public park without a permit.112 Holmes 
opined that the state could control its property just like a private landowner.113 Given this 
absolute authority to end public access altogether, Holmes saw no problem if the state took 
“the lesser step of limiting the public use to certain purposes.”114 In other words, the 
preacher may have a “constitutional right to talk religion, but he has no constitutional right 
to use [a public park].”115 
The United State Supreme Court fully embraced this distinction when it affirmed 
the Davis decision along with Holmes’ reasoning: 
 
For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking 
in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of 
a member of the public than for an owner of a private house to forbid it 
in his house.116 
 
According to Holmes, and now the Supreme Court, the state could ask its citizens to sur-
render their freedom to speak in order to receive public benefits. As the Justices adopted 
this principle, it was also increasing in influence around the nation as numerous state courts 
used it to defeat a variety of constitutional claims brought by public employees, licensees, 
and welfare beneficiaries.117 The high Court itself would continue to apply the distinction 
against recipients of government benefits for another sixty years. 
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 110. Id. at 517-518. 
 111. Id. at 518. 
 112. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895). 
 113. Id. 
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 115. Van Alstyne, supra note 100, at 1440. 
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Shepardizing McAuliffe yielded more than 70 cases, 77% of which resolved the decision 
against the constitutional claim being asserted. See, e.g., Hirschman v. L.A. Cnty., 231 
P.2d 140 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951), aff’d, 39 Cal. 2d 698, 249 P.2d 287 (1952) (county 
employees dismissed for refusal to sign loyalty oath); Hornstein v. Ill. Liquor Control 
Comm’n, 412 Ill. 365, 106 N.E.2d 354 (1952) (summary revocation of liquor license with-
out prior notice or hearing); Wilkie v. O’Connor, 261 App. Div. 373, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617 
(1941) (welfare pension cut off after recipient’s insistence on ‘right to sleep under an old 
barn, in a nest of rags’); CIO v. City of Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1946) 
(injunction against no-union rule for city employees denied); Starkey v. Bd. of Educ., 14 
Utah 2d 227, 381 P.2d 718 (1963) (married high school student barred from extracurricular 
activities). 
Id. 
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For example, as discussed above, the Supreme Court utilized the distinction in Ham-
ilton to affirm the state’s power to require military training as a condition of receiving a 
public education.118 Then, in the 1947 case United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 
the Court applied the distinction to a federal worker who was charged119 with violating the 
Hatch Act for taking an “active part in . . . [a] political campaign[].”120 The federal worker 
challenged the Act as an unconstitutional restraint on his ability to engage in political ac-
tivities.121 Quietly citing to McAuliffe in a footnote, the Court found “no constitutional 
objection” to the Act.122 Congress, the Court opined, was free to impose on the petitioner’s 
political actions in the interest of providing an “efficient public service.”123 
Yet this subtle opinion carried significant and troubling implications. The Hatch 
Act124 prohibited approximately three million federal employees125 and their families126 
from taking any active part in a political campaign, even during their free time.127 The Act 
thus constituted an unprecedented intrusion upon constitutional liberties.128 Never before 
had the right-privilege distinction been stretched so far. Indeed, the distinction could ap-
parently be applied beyond the workplace and into citizens’ private lives to extinguish the 
freedom of speech and other liberties. 
The Court confirmed this conclusion five years later in Adler v. Board of Education, 
when various teachers challenged a New York law that barred from employment any per-
son who advocates or belongs to an organization that advocates the overthrow of govern-
ment by “force, violence or any unlawful means.”129 Relying upon United Public Workers, 
the Court summarily dispatched the teachers’ claims in a manner reminiscent of Holmes: 
 
It is clear that such persons have the right under our law to assemble, 
speak, think and believe as they will. It is equally clear that they have 
no right to work for the State in the school system on their own terms. 
They may work for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid 
down by the proper authorities of New York. If they do not choose to 
work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associ-
ations and go elsewhere. Has the State thus deprived them of any right 
to free speech or assembly? We think not.130 
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Adler therefore reaffirmed the Court’s “take it or leave it” approach to the receipt of gov-
ernment benefits. Moreover, the case represents the zenith of the right-privilege distinc-
tion’s influence. In an opinion that was both curt and exceptionally broad, the Adler Court 
trumpeted what United Public Workers only implied: The state could require citizens to 
choose between their First Amendment rights and public employment.131 
Was there any end to the conditions the government could place upon its largess? 
The Court’s answer appeared to be in the negative, but interestingly, it had conceded such 
a limit in United Public Workers.132 There, the petitioner argued that if Congress could 
enforce the Hatch Act, it could also pass a “regulation providing that no Republican, Jew 
or Negro shall be appointed to federal office or that no federal employee shall attend Mass 
or take any active part in missionary work.”133 While the United Public Workers Court 
sustained the Hatch Act, it conceded that congressional power over its employees was not 
limitless.134 And it was this concession that would set the stage for the demise of the right-
privilege distinction. 
2. The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction 
Nine months after Adler, in Wieman v. Updegraff, the Court considered whether the 
state had the power to impose upon state university professors “an oath that they are not 
. . . members of any . . . ‘subversive’ or ‘Communist-front’ [organizations].”135 Several 
professors refused to take the oath and sought to enjoin enforcement of the Act.136 The 
state supreme court upheld the Act and ordered the state to discontinue any further salary 
payments to the dissenting professors.137 The United States Supreme Court granted review 
“because of the public importance of this legislation and the recurring serious constitu-
tional questions which it presents.”138 
The state insisted that Adler and United Public Workers controlled because the pro-
fessors at issue had “no right to work for the State in the school system on their own 
terms.”139 In a historic shift, the Court explained that Adler was not dispositive because, 
as it had conceded in United Public Workers, the government’s power over its employees 
was not boundless.140 “We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public 
                                                          
 131. Id. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
I have not been able to accept the recent doctrine that a citizen who enters the public ser-
vice can be forced to sacrifice his civil rights. I cannot for example find in our constitu-
tional scheme the power of a state to place its employees in the category of second-class 
citizens by denying them freedom of thought and expression. The Constitution guarantees 
freedom of thought and expression to everyone in our society. All are entitled to it; and 
none needs it more than the teacher. 
Id. 
 132. United Pub. Workers of Am., 330 U.S. at 100. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. (“None would deny such limitations on Congressional power but because there are some limitations 
it does not follow that a prohibition against acting as ward leader or worker at the polls is invalid.”). 
 135. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 194 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 136. Id. at 184-86 (majority opinion). 
 137. Id. at 186. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 191. 
 140. Wieman, 344 U.S. at 191-92. 
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employment exists. It is sufficient to say that the constitutional protection does extend to 
the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discrimi-
natory.”141 
For the first time, the Court expressly held that the government could not impose 
unlimited conditions upon the “privilege” of public employment.142 Wieman signaled the 
Justices’ disagreement with Holmes’s statement that public employees had no right to talk 
politics. The Court subsequently reaffirmed this position in the academic employment con-
text multiple times over the next fifteen years, ruling that the state lacked the power to 
hold a professor in contempt for refusing to answer questions about his allegedly “subver-
sive” activities,143 or to compel school teachers to divulge every organization to which 
they have belonged,144 or to require professors to certify that they had never “advocated” 
for the violent overthrow of the government.145 
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, the 
Court made its rejection of the right-privilege distinction in public employment explicit by 
overturning the very law upheld in Adler.146  
 
Subdivision 2 of the Feinberg Law was . . . before the Court in Adler 
and its constitutionality was sustained. But constitutional doctrine which 
has emerged since that decision has rejected its major premise. . . . that 
public employment, including academic employment, may be condi-
tioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be 
abridged by direct government action.147 
 
In Keyishian and in subsequent cases, the Court explained that Adler’s “major premise” 
had been rejected because denying a benefit based on the exercise of a constitutional right 
“would allow the government to ‘produce a result which (it) could not command di-
rectly.’”148 What the Constitution forbids the government to do directly it equally forbids 
the government to do indirectly.149 The Justices signaled that the right-privilege distinc-
tion’s end-run around the Constitution must cease and that the state may no longer place 
“unconstitutional conditions”150 upon benefits such as public employment. 
                                                          
[I]n United Public Workers, though we held that the Federal Government through the 
Hatch Act . . . could properly bar its employees from certain types of political activity . . . 
we cast this holding into perspective by emphasizing that Congress could not “enact a 
regulation providing that no Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, 
or that no federal employee shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary work. 
Id. 
 141. Id. at 192. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 254-55 (1957). 
 144. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960). 
 145. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967). 
 146. Id. at 589. 
 147. Id. at 605 (alteration in original). 
 148. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). 
 149. Van Alstyne, supra note 100 at 1445-46. 
 150. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006). “[T]he government may 
not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected [. . .] freedom of speech even 
if he has no entitlement to that benefit.” Id. (citations omitted). Of course, this doctrine is not unlimited, as the 
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While Wieman and Keyishian rejected the right-privilege distinction in the academic 
employment setting, these cases had obvious implications for First Amendment freedoms 
in other contexts. As we shall see, in a series of decisions, the Justices unraveled the dis-
tinction and upheld the rights of citizens to challenge government conditions imposed upon 
benefits such as tax exemptions, unemployment benefits, and ultimately, public education. 
Speiser v. Randall raised the question of whether the State of California could re-
quire veterans seeking a state property tax exemption to sign an affidavit declaring that 
they did not advocate for the overthrow of the government by unlawful means.151 The State 
defended the requirement, contending that because a tax exemption is a “‘privilege’ . . . its 
denial may not infringe speech.”152 The high Court disagreed, holding that “the denial of 
a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech necessarily will have the effect of coercing 
the claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech.”153 The declaration requirement 
heightened these concerns by requiring the veteran to prove that he did not embrace the 
prohibited viewpoint.154 This procedural mechanism, the Court opined, chilled speech and 
violated due process.155 Speiser revealed that the Court’s impatience with indirect assaults 
upon the First Amendment extended beyond public employment. 
In Sherbert v. Verner, the State of South Carolina declared the petitioner, a Seventh 
Day Adventist, ineligible for unemployment benefits because she would not work on the 
Sabbath pursuant to her religious beliefs.156 The state supreme court found that this denial 
had no effect on her right to observe her religion.157 But the federal Justices disagreed, 
concluding that the state simply cannot place conditions on public benefits if they operate 
to “deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.”158 The Court reasoned that South 
Carolina penalized Ms. Sherbert’s free exercise rights just as California had chilled Mr. 
Speiser’s freedom of speech.159 South Carolina, hence, could not force Ms. Sherbert to 
choose between her faith and her benefits.160 
Moreover, the Court chastised the South Carolina court for even raising the right-
privilege distinction.161 “It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and 
expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or 
privilege.”162 To further drive the point home, the Court cited to Wieman, Speiser, and 
other decisions in which it and lower courts had invalidated conditions placed on govern-
mental benefits that impeded constitutionally protected conduct.163 The Court’s sweeping 
                                                          
government may place some reasonable conditions upon the receipt of benefits. Such acceptable conditions pri-
marily arise in the context of direct government funding. Accordingly, this exception to the rule has had little or 
no application in the university context except where receipt of direct government subsidies was at issue. See 
supra note 106.  
 151. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 515 (1958). 
 152. Id. at 518. 
 153. Id. at 519. 
 154. Id. at 521-22. 
 155. Id. at 528-29. 
 156. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399-401 (1963). 
 157. Id. at 401. 
 158. Id. at 405. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 410. 
 161. Sherbert, 384 U.S. at 404. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 404-05. 
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condemnation of South Carolina’s unemployment criterion effectively buried the legiti-
macy of the right-privilege distinction as a viable constitutional defense. 
3. The Rejection of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Public Education 
Though the Court had explicitly rejected the right-privilege distinction in contexts 
of public employment, tax exemptions, and unemployment benefits, it was not clear how 
those decisions would impact public education. That changed in the landmark student 
speech case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.164 The facts 
of Tinker are well known, as the Court famously enunciated the constitutional standard for 
student speech in the public elementary and secondary schoolhouse settings.165 A student 
may “express his opinions, even on controversial subjects . . . if he does so without ‘ma-
terially and substantially interfer(ing) with the requirements of appropriate discipline in 
the operation of the school.’”166 Applying this standard, the Court held that the school ad-
ministrators violated the Tinkers’ First Amendment rights by banning their symbolic arm-
bands.167 
What is less well known about the case, however, is that it was the first time since 
Barnette that the Court directly addressed Hamilton’s impact upon students’ First Amend-
ment rights. As the Court announced that teachers and students did not abandon their rights 
at the schoolhouse gate, it undermined Hamilton in a significant footnote.168 Indeed, this 
was necessary because Hamilton had not been directly overruled169 and could itself have 
undone the Tinker decision, given that public education had not been held to be a “right.”170 
 
[Hamilton] is sometimes cited for the broad proposition that the State 
may attach conditions to attendance at a state university that require in-
dividuals to violate their religious convictions. . . . The decision cannot 
be taken as establishing that the State may impose and enforce any con-
ditions that it chooses upon attendance at public institutions of learning, 
however violative they may be of fundamental constitutional guaran-
tees. See, e.g. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624.171 
 
In this single footnote, the Court finally signified its retreat from Hamilton and expressly 
acknowledged that the right-privilege distinction no longer applied to public education.172 
Moreover, the citation to Barnette indicated specifically that the distinction would provide 
                                                          
 164. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 165. Id. at 504, 512-13. 
 166. Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (alteration in original).  
 167. Id. at 514. 
 168. Id. at 506 n.2. 
 169. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 251-52 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 170. See Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“Public education is not a ‘right’ granted to individuals by 
the Constitution.”). 
 171. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 n.2 (citations omitted). 
 172. Hamilton may still retain some vitality on the grounds that the decision also relied upon the State’s “power 
to raise militia and impose the duties of service therein upon its citizens.” W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 632 (1943). 
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no shelter for state educators who compelled student speech. Therefore, the Tinker Court 
rejected the idea that the state could condition the receipt of a public education on the 
forfeiture of essential liberties, and it hinted the same for higher education.173 
The Court explicitly extended Tinker’s rejection of the right-privilege distinction to 
higher education three years later in Healy v. James.174 In Healy, a group of students at 
Connecticut State Community College requested official recognition from the college for 
a proposed student group called the “Students for Democratic Society” (SDS).175 The pres-
ident of the college, fearing that the student group would adopt the violent philosophy of 
the national chapter of SDS, denied recognition.176 The students sued, alleging violations 
of their rights to expression and association.177 Both the district court and the court of 
appeals agreed that no associational rights were violated because the college simply with-
held its official “stamp of approval,” while allowing the students to meet informally on 
campus.178 
The Supreme Court concurred that official recognition was a privilege, but it ob-
jected to the lower courts’ appraisal of the consequences of withholding that privilege.179 
Noting that this precise issue was novel, the Court pointed out that it had “consistently 
disapproved governmental action . . . denying rights and privileges solely because of a 
citizen’s association with an unpopular organization.”180 “There can be no doubt,” the 
Court announced, “that denial of official recognition, without justification, to college or-
ganizations burdens or abridges that associational right.”181 The Court then reversed and 
remanded the case, instructing the lower court that the university bore the “heavy burden” 
of justifying the denial of recognition.182 
The Court could not have been clearer in rejecting Hamilton’s premise that college 
students waived their rights when they accepted the benefit of a public education. The SDS 
students, having already accepted the initial benefit of public education, were seeking an 
additional benefit—official recognition—and the Court ruled that even this subsequent 
benefit could not be withheld arbitrarily.183 Moreover, the Court dispersed the cloud Ham-
ilton had cast over the availability of constitutional liberties at public universities. “[S]tate 
colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amend-
ment.”184 “The precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that . . . First Amend-
ment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community 
at large.”185 
While neither Tinker nor Healy directly addressed the college curriculum, the Court 
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 175. Id. at 172. 
 176. Id. at 174-75. 
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 178. Id. at 179.  
 179. Healy, 408 U.S. at 193. 
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shut the door on the conclusion that First Amendment rights could be denied on a univer-
sity or high school campus simply because a plaintiff-student had “voluntarily enrolled” 
there. The same year as Healy, the court further strengthened this position by reaffirming 
the right-privilege distinction’s burial: 
 
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though 
a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even 
though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of 
reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not 
rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his 
constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom 
of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person be-
cause of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exer-
cise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This 
would allow the government to ‘produce a result which (it) could not 
command directly.’ Such interference with constitutional rights is im-
permissible.186 
 
Thus, the “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier no longer has any foundation upon 
which to stand. It cannot be justified on the grounds that unlawful compulsion can only 
exist where enrollment is mandatory, because enrollment is optional in both pre-collegiate 
and collegiate institutions of learning. And several compelled speech, establishment 
clause, and free exercise clause plaintiffs have succeeded in settings in which participation 
was voluntary. Likewise, the disqualifier cannot be supported by the right-privilege dis-
tinction because that distinction has eroded over time and no longer justifies the denial of 
constitutional claims. Without these two foundational premises, the “voluntary enroll-
ment” disqualifier is simply of no effect. 
C. Federal Courts have Recognized that Public University Students have Compelled 
Speech Claims against Curricular and Curricular-related Requirements. 
The compelled speech jurisprudence becomes much clearer once one removes the 
two defunct premises of the “voluntary enrollment” nullifier. For without those premises, 
Barnette itself supports the recognition of a curricular compelled speech claim.187 Like-
wise, more recent decisions from the Supreme Court and two federal courts of appeals that 
have relied on Barnette have permitted review of compelled speech claims against curric-
ular and curricular-related requirements. 
1. Barnette: Grade School Curricular Requirements 
The Eleventh Circuit should have recognized that Barnette itself, when shorn of the 
“voluntary enrollment” disqualifier, supports the position that judicial review exists for 
compelled speech claims against university curricula. For the Pledge and salute in that case 
were state curricular mandates. Furthermore, the heightened constitutional protection 
                                                          
 186. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (alteration in original). 
 187. See generally, W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (discussing the constitutionality 
of compelling public school students to salute the American flag). 
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given to adults in the college environment leaves little reason to distinguish it from the 
public school context in Barnette. Therefore, college adults must, at a minimum, be enti-
tled to the same level of First Amendment protection enjoyed by grade school children. 
The Supreme Court has explained that “activities may fairly be characterized as part 
of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so 
long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular 
knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.”188 With this definition in mind, 
it becomes evident that the Barnette children’s religious scruples conflicted with a state 
curricular requirement. For the West Virginia State Board of Education had adopted the 
flag salute as “a regular part of the program of activities in the public schools”189 in order 
to promote “national unity.”190 Moreover, the state adopted the measure in response to 
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, wherein the Court upheld the salute because a con-
trary holding would intrude into the “pedagogical and psychological dogma” of the 
schools.191 Also, the West Virginia district court recognized that the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ 
objections to the flag salute confronted the “educational policy” of the state.192 The courts’ 
references to “program of activities,” “pedagog[y],” “psychological dogma,” and “educa-
tional policy” undoubtedly refer to the school curriculum. 
Moreover, the Barnette Court recognized that the precise issue before it was a matter 
of teaching, the quintessential method for transmitting a school’s curriculum to the stu-
dents. 
 
As the present Chief Justice said in dissent in the Gobitis case, the State 
may ‘require teaching by instruction and study of all in our history and 
in the structure and organization of our government, including the guar-
anties of civil liberty which tend to inspire patriotism and love of coun-
try.’ Here, however, we are dealing with a compulsion of students to 
declare a belief. They are not merely made acquainted with the flag sa-
lute so that they may be informed as to what it is or even what it means. 
The issue here is whether this slow and easily neglected route to aroused 
loyalties constitutionally may be short-cut by substituting a compulsory 
salute and slogan.193 
 
The Court thus specified that the state could not shortcut the educational process by com-
pelling speech.194 Its holding confirms that there are constitutional limits on how a public 
school may accomplish its curricular goals.195 Public schools may educate, but not indoc-
trinate.196 They may persuade students, but not compel them to articulate state-approved 
                                                          
 188. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlhmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
 189. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626. 
 190. Id. at 640. 
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 193. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 631 (emphasis added). 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id.  
 196. Id.  
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beliefs.197 
While the Barnette opinion was issued in the pre-collegiate context, the nature of 
the environment and the age of the students in higher education both cut in favor of ex-
tending Barnette’s reasoning to the university setting. The courts have made this point 
explicit when dealing with the corollary of compelled speech, government censorship.198 
The public university holds a constitutionally unique place in our culture. Indeed, it 
is well-recognized that “[t]he college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 
the marketplace of ideas.”199 Liberty is the lifeblood of this marketplace, without which all 
of society suffers.200 “The essentiality of freedom in the community of American univer-
sities is almost self-evident. . . . [S]tudents must always remain free to inquire, to study 
and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will 
stagnate and die.”201 Given the implications at stake, the door is tightly shut against the 
view that our first liberties “apply with less force on college campuses,” for “(t)he vigilant 
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of 
American schools.”202 These judicial exhortations signify that the First Amendment oper-
ates on college grounds with more vigor than it does on high school campuses. Therefore, 
if Barnette is sound jurisprudence for the latter, then it must be so for the former. 
Moreover, the university classroom is attended almost exclusively by adult students 
who are granted greater freedom than their minor counterparts. The courts have consist-
ently recognized that the First Amendment rights of schoolchildren “are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”203 “The First Amendment guaran-
tees wide freedom in matters of adult public discourse.”204 Consequently, “public second-
ary and elementary school administrators are granted more leeway [to restrict speech] than 
public colleges and universities.”205 The corollary to this principle is also true. Power to 
compel student speech—if any—is more circumscribed on the college campus than in the 
public school classroom. If therefore, as Barnette holds, public school officials are not 
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immune from suit for using curricula to compel speech, then neither are university offi-
cials. The Supreme Court has implied this conclusion while two courts of appeals have 
held so expressly. 
2. Southworth: University Curricular-Related Requirements 
In Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, the Su-
preme Court addressed its first compelled speech claim in the university context.206 A 
group of students challenged the mandatory student fee imposed by the University of Wis-
consin (UW) to fund the extracurricular speech of other students.207 The students claimed 
the fee subsidized political and ideological speech that was offensive to their personal be-
liefs.208 Outside of the university setting, forced subsidy policies had been stricken as com-
pelled speech in prior cases, and the Court now recognized this principle as applicable to 
public universities.209 “If the University conditions the opportunity to receive a college 
education . . . on an agreement to support objectionable, extracurricular expression by 
other students, [First Amendment] rights . . . become implicated.”210 Under this principle, 
the Court ruled that Wisconsin’s fee system could only survive constitutional scrutiny if it 
ensured that funds were allocated in a viewpoint-neutral manner.211 The Court then re-
manded to confirm compliance with this rule.212 While the Court’s decision addressed 
compelled “extracurricular speech,” its reasoning supports recognition of compelled cur-
ricular speech claims as well. 
Significantly, the Justices lessened the distinction between curricular and extracur-
ricular activities by tying them both into the broad academic mission of the university. For 
example, the Court accepted the University’s contention that its academic mission was 
well served213 when students had the “means to engage in dynamic discussions of philo-
sophical, religious, scientific, social, and political subjects . . . outside the lecture hall.”214 
Similarly, the concurring Justices characterized student organization activities as a “sec-
ond curriculum.”215 The Court in a subsequent case made this comparison explicit: “A 
                                                          
 206. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). In Rosenberger, the Court 
acknowledged, but did not resolve, the question of whether a public university transgresses the compelled speech 
doctrine by requiring its students to pay fees to support the extracurricular speech of other students. Id. at 233. 
 207. Id. at 226-27. 
 208. Id. at 227. 
 209. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (invalidating rule allowing union to use a 
portion of union dues for political causes). 
 210. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 231. 
 211. Id. at 233-34. 
Viewpoint neutrality is the justification for requiring the student to pay the fee in the first 
instance and for ensuring the integrity of the program's operation once the funds have been 
collected. We conclude that the University of Wisconsin may sustain the extracurricular 
dimensions of its programs by using mandatory student fees with viewpoint neutrality as 
the operational principle.  
Id. 
 212. Id. at 235-36. 
 213. Id. at 222-23. The university maintained that the fees “enhance[d] the educational experience” of its stu-
dents. Id. at 223. 
 214. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 233.  
 215. Id. at 237 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting the University’s Student Organization Handbook). 
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college’s commission—and its concomitant license to choose among pedagogical ap-
proaches—is not confined to the classroom, for extracurricular programs are, today, es-
sential parts of the educational process.”216 By placing both extracurricular and curricular 
requirements under the university’s broad academic mission, the Court has logically com-
mitted to similar constitutional treatment for both. 
Of course, the Southworth Court recognized that its compelled speech findings 
would not apply in situations in which the government itself is speaking,217 and explained 
that the government speech doctrine would instead apply when a professor is speaking in 
an academic context.218 However, this observation does not undercut the claims of students 
like Jennifer Keeton (or fictitious students like Lucy and Alysse). When these students 
complete their assignments, it is they—not the government—who are speaking.219 This is 
true at both the high school220 and the university level.221 
This caveat aside, Southworth clearly recognized a compelled speech claim in the 
university context. The Court’s decision to focus on the broad academic mission of the 
university has blurred the lines between curricular and extracurricular policies. Therefore, 
the Court’s recognition of a curricular-related extracurricular compelled speech claim im-
plicitly supports the existence of a curricular one.  
3. Axson-Flynn and Ward: University Curricular Requirements 
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, two other circuits have recognized that university stu-
dents can raise compelled speech claims, even though they voluntarily enrolled. In Axson-
Flynn v. Johnson, a former University of Utah student brought suit against the faculty in 
the school’s Actor Training Program (ATP) after she was forced to read a script that con-
tained certain words she considered offensive and blasphemous to her Mormon faith.222 
She claimed, among other things, that the requirement compelled her to speak in violation 
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of the First Amendment.223 The Tenth Circuit quickly dispelled the notion that Axson-
Flynn’s speech was “government speech.”224 Instead, the court concluded that her claim 
should be analyzed under minimal scrutiny because the script was part of the curricu-
lum.225 Yet, the court found a genuine issue for trial as to whether the script requirement 
was motivated by anti-Mormon bias.226 Significantly, the court of appeals did not imme-
diately foreclose Axson-Flynn’s compelled speech suit, but rather, acknowledged she had 
a cognizable claim.227 
The Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Ward v. Polite.228 Julea Ward, a 
graduate counseling student at Eastern Michigan University (EMU), was expelled from 
the program when she asked to refer a client in EMU’s clinic who sought gay-supportive 
counseling that conflicted with her strong Christian beliefs.229 Ms. Ward challenged the 
expulsion under the compelled speech doctrine, arguing that EMU required her to speak 
the university’s gay-affirming message to clients even though it permitted other student-
counselors to refer clients who raised different value conflicts.230 The Sixth Circuit agreed 
with the Tenth Circuit that curriculum-related student speech should be subject to minimal 
scrutiny.231 Interestingly, the court noted that because a college student is not forced to be 
there, it would be a “rare day when a student [could] exercise a First Amendment veto 
over [the curriculum].”232 Nonetheless, the court ruled that such a day had arrived.233 
Hearkening back to Barnette, it ruled that EMU’s no referral policy appeared to “man-
date[] orthodoxy” rather than tolerance on the issue of homosexuality.234 Consequently, it 
permitted the case to go to trial.235 
Both Axson-Flynn and Ward recognized—albeit narrowly—what the Eleventh Cir-
cuit rejected outright. Public university curricula are not immune from compelled speech 
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claims. The Keeton court’s flat ban on such claims has split the circuits and forces college 
students to shed their constitutional rights at the university admissions office in violation 
of principles declared in a long line of Supreme Court cases from Barnette to Tinker to 
Southworth. 
PART III: THE DISTURBING IMPLICATIONS OF THE “VOLUNTARY ENROLLMENT” 
DISQUALIFIER. 
The Eleventh Circuit’s “voluntary enrollment” nullifier would have drastic reper-
cussions for constitutional liberties. Taken to its logical end, the nullifier would have re-
versed several landmark speech cases and jeopardized other basic freedoms Americans 
currently enjoy inside and outside the classroom. 
A. On-Campus Consequences 
As a matter of policy, the “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier would have devastat-
ing implications for campus liberty, for the disqualifier has no logical limitation. The 
Keeton court bluntly asserted that Ms. Keeton, “having voluntarily enrolled in the [coun-
seling] program, does not have a constitutional right to refuse to comply with [the] condi-
tions” that violated her conscience.236 The Eleventh Circuit may have wished to limit the 
principle to compelled speech claims, but this is limitation by fiat. For if voluntary matric-
ulation extinguishes a student’s compelled speech claim, it is unclear why other speech 
claims would remain viable. After all, under the First Amendment, compelled speech and 
compelled silence are “constitutional[ly] equivalen[t].”237 A cursory review of a few land-
mark speech decisions demonstrates the logical—and disturbing—consequences of the 
disqualifier. 
In Papish v. Board of Curators of University of Missouri, the university expelled 
graduate student Barbara Papish for distributing a newspaper containing “indecent” speech 
in violation of the General Standards of Student Conduct.238 Ms. Papish sued, claiming the 
expulsion violated her First Amendment rights.239 Both lower courts denied relief but the 
Supreme Court reversed, holding “that the mere dissemination of ideas—no matter how 
offensive to good taste—on a state university cammpus [sic] may not be shut off in the 
name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’”240 This ruling stands as a powerful affirmation 
of the breadth of speech protection for university students. 
But the Keeton court would have reached the opposite conclusion. Applying the 
“voluntary enrollment” disqualifier, it would have concluded: 
 
[The University of Missouri] has conditioned participation in its [grad-
uate program] and graduation on compliance with [the General Stand-
ards of Student Conduct] and [Papish], having voluntarily enrolled in 
the program, does not have a constitutional right to refuse to comply 
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with those conditions.241 
 
This reversal is beyond mere conjecture, for the district court ruled against Ms. Papish on 
these precise grounds.242 
Likewise, the Keeton court would have ruled against the religious student group, 
Cornerstone, in Widmar v. Vincent, unlike the Supreme Court.243 In Widmar, University 
of Missouri Kansas City (UMKC) had made its facilities generally available for use by all 
student organizations, but passed a new policy excluding any group from using such facil-
ities for “religious worship or religious teaching.”244 Pursuant to this new policy, UMKC 
refused to allow Cornerstone to continue using its facilities.245 The case was significant 
because the Supreme Court had not directly addressed how or whether the First Amend-
ment public forum doctrine might apply on a university campus.246 While the Court had 
hinted in prior cases that the college campus possessed some of the features of public 
forums, it had also permitted colleges to impose “reasonable regulations” on the use of 
their facilities to preserve their unique academic mission.247 Over one dissent, the Court 
applied the public forum doctrine to the facilities at issue and held that content-based ex-
clusions from a “generally open forum” must be justified by a compelling state interest.248 
UMKC’s exclusion of Cornerstone failed this test.249 This bedrock decision firmly estab-
lished the forum doctrine as a foundational principle of analysis for campus speech claims. 
However, the Keeton court never would have reached this conclusion under the “vol-
untary enrollment” principle. UMKC essentially conditioned the use of its facilities upon 
compliance with its regulations.250 Thus, under Keeton, the students of Cornerstone, who 
chose to attend the school, had no grounds to object. Their remedy was simply to “choose 
not to attend [UMKC].”251 
The disqualifier would have likewise thwarted the First Amendment claims of mem-
bers of Wide Awake Productions (WAP), again in stark contrast to the Supreme Court’s 
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decision in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia.252 There, the 
Supreme Court invalidated the university’s student activity funding policy because it ex-
cluded from eligibility student journalistic efforts that “manifest[] a particular belie[f] in 
or about a deity.”253 This exclusion, in the Court’s opinion, discriminated against the reli-
gious viewpoint of WAP’s members,254 and thus, transgressed the First Amendment.255 
But again, the conclusion would have been quite different under the “voluntary en-
rollment” analysis, which would have quashed the students’ claim upon arrival. The Uni-
versity of Virginia had simply conditioned the opportunity to receive student activity funds 
on acquiescence to the university’s guidelines. WAP was at liberty to maintain its beliefs 
and go elsewhere. But having chosen to apply for the funds, it had no grounds to object to 
the no-deity exclusion. 
As this sample of cases demonstrates, the “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier would 
likely have reversed the outcomes in three landmark college speech cases and thereby 
crippled campus freedom. As if this was not troubling enough, there appears to be no prin-
cipled reason why the disqualifier would not also affect other First Amendment rights, 
such as the free exercise of religion, the freedom from an establishment of religion, and 
the freedom of association. After all, the Hamilton Court used the disqualifier to dispense 
with a free exercise challenge to a college curricular mandate.256 Would not the disqualifier 
also permit a state college to compel a student to participate in an official prayer against 
the command of the Fourth Circuit or partake in a chapel service against the decree of the 
D.C. Circuit?257 Would not a state similarly possess the authority to refuse to recognize a 
student group based on the group’s philosophy in contravention of Healy?258 The Eleventh 
Circuit’s resurrection of the disqualifier provides no assurances that these questions would 
be answered in the negative. 
Furthermore, this unraveling of campus freedom would not stop with the First 
Amendment, for if a university can require incoming students to waive their First Amend-
ment rights as a condition of receiving school benefits, on what grounds can other free-
doms be thought safe? Justice Rutledge made this very point in 1926: “If the state may 
compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like 
manner compel a surrender of all.”259 Accordingly, high school students would have to 
choose their future alma maters with the motto “caveat emptor” in mind. For once a student 
matriculated, he would have no grounds to challenge, for example, unlawful searches or 
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seizures260 or denials of due process.261 Indeed, the “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier 
raises serious questions as to whether pre-enrollment discriminatory admissions policies 
themselves would be immune from an equal protection challenge.262 Under this regime, 
the Constitution would bow to the whim of university officials and the extent of liberty 
experienced by students would vary from campus to campus. It is simply inconceivable 
that fundamental freedoms can be manipulated in this manner, particularly in the heart of 
the “marketplace of ideas.”263 
B. Off-Campus Consequences 
Furthermore, taken to its broadest application, the “voluntary enrollment” disquali-
fier would eclipse basic liberties even beyond the collegiate context. With the increasing 
influence of the federal and state government over the life of the individual in employment, 
education, housing, welfare, and most recently, healthcare, there are innumerable ways in 
which the individual “voluntarily” interacts with his government.264 The disqualifier per-
mits the government to compel citizens to choose between their conscience and vital public 
benefits. 
For one thing, the disqualifier would essentially gut the compelled speech doctrine 
and the free exercise of religion. For example, citizens “voluntarily” apply for driver’s 
licenses, and so the state could force them to serve as “mobile billboard[s]” for offensive 
government messages.265 Similarly, as citizens choose to obtain parade permits, the state 
could compel the parade organizers “to propound a particular point of view.”266 If a citizen 
voluntarily accepts a political commission, the state could force him to profess “a belief in 
the existence of God” against his will.267 And a religious person who lost her job could be 
constrained to choose between her unemployment benefits and the dictates of her faith.268 
Plaintiffs in these situations would have no grounds to complain, for they could simply 
choose not to accept the benefits at issue. Of course, the government cannot constitution-
ally impose such a Morton’s Fork on its citizens. Yet, logically, such state action would 
be permissible if the principle of “voluntary enrollment” were the law of the land. 
For another thing, the disqualifier would essentially permit a return to the narrow 
concept of freedom under the right-privilege distinction that reigned between McAuliffe 
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and Adler. The state would again be free to require the individual to relinquish his consti-
tutional rights as a condition of receiving any governmental benefit he chooses to receive. 
Restoring McAuliffe and Adler would require the Court to reverse its landmark de-
cisions protecting the rights of public employees. Policemen, federal workers, and teachers 
alike would have no right to “talk politics,”269 take part in a “political campaign[]”270 or 
refuse to sign a “loyalty oath.”271 Similarly, the resurrection of Davis, would set back the 
well-established scope of protection for speech in public forums.272 For decades now, it 
has been well-recognized that the “Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclu-
sions from a forum generally open to the public, even if it was not required to create the 
forum in the first place.”273 Not so under Davis, wherein a state empowered to close the 
forum altogether, may opt to selectively permit access to certain speakers. Such selective 
permission contradicts the Supreme Court’s current equal access jurisprudence and grants 
states unbridled discretion to discriminate against unpopular viewpoints.274 Of course, 
such censorship is anathema to the First Amendment.275 Yet, these are only a few examples 
of the disqualifier’s collateral damage. As in the university setting, rights protecting pri-
vacy, due process, and equal protection would likewise be jeopardized. Indeed, no rights 
are safe under the “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier. 
These consequences are severe. However, they flow logically from the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s application of the “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier. Federal courts that consider 
following in Keeton’s footsteps must recognize the unintended consequences the doctrine 
is likely to produce. 
CONCLUSION 
The Eleventh Circuit erred as a matter of law and policy when it held that a student 
had no right to bring a compelled speech claim against her public university’s curriculum 
merely because she “voluntarily enrolled” in the program. The court’s holding is legally 
improper because it relied upon two premises taken from Barnette and Hamilton that are 
no longer valid. First, enrollment is in fact “voluntary” at both pre-collegiate and collegiate 
institutions because the state cannot constitutionally compel attendance at public schools. 
As federal courts have found violations of the Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Establish-
ment Clauses inside and outside the university setting, they have inherently recognized 
that a citizen’s choice—including a student’s choice to enroll—does not extinguish un-
lawful state coercion. Second, the fact that education is a “privilege” rather than a “right” 
is irrelevant to the compelled speech analysis. The right-privilege distinction no longer 
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permits the state to attach unconstitutional conditions to the receipt of benefits, such as a 
public education. With these errant premises purged from Barnette, the decision itself sup-
ports recognition of a compelled speech claim against a public college curriculum.276 
Moreover, the Supreme Court suggested this result when it recognized that the First 
Amendment is implicated when universities compel student speech in the curriculum-re-
lated context, and two federal courts of appeals have done so in the curricular context.277 
Finally, recognizing such compelled speech claims avoids the inherent policy difficulties 
raised by the “voluntary enrollment” disqualifier. For the disqualifier, taken to its logical 
conclusion, would eliminate freedom in a wide variety of situations in which the individual 
voluntarily interacts with his government, on or off campus. 
Future courts should disregard the disqualifier that the Keeton court tried to resusci-
tate and permit judicial review of compelled speech claims against public college curric-
ula. Anything less would darken that one fixed star of constitutional jurisprudence meant 
to provide expansive protection for freedom of conscience. And it would do so in the one 
context where First Amendment rights are supposed to be at their apex: the campuses of 
our public colleges and universities. 
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